Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
中国 亚洲开发银行


中华人民共和国与亚洲开发银行贷款协定


（吉林高速公路项目）
（签订日期１９９４年１月５日）
　　中华人民共和国（以下简称“借款人”）与亚洲开发银行（以下简称“亚行”）于一九九四年一月五日签订贷款协定。
　　鉴于：
　　（Ａ）借款人已向亚行提出用于本贷款协定附件一中所述项目的贷款申请；
　　（Ｂ）借款人还为公路部门机构加强和政策支持的目的向亚行申请技术援助（以下简称“技援”），通过同日在此由借款人政府和亚行所签订的技援协议，亚行同意提供一笔总额相当于一百二十万美元（＄１，２００，０００）的赠款；
　　（Ｃ）本项目将由吉林省高速公路公司执行，为此，借款人将按亚行满意的条件和条款把本贷款协定规定的贷款资金转贷给吉林省高速公路公司；
　　（Ｄ）吉林省高速公路公司受吉林省人民政府的领导和监督。
　　（Ｅ）亚行已同意按本协定以及亚行与吉林省高速公路公司同日签订的项目协议中所规定的条件和条款，从亚行普通资金中提供一笔贷款。
　　双方达成协议如下：

　　第一条　贷款条例；定义
　　第１．０１款　一九八六年七月一日亚行颁布的《普通业务贷款条例》中的所有条款均适用于本贷款协定，应视同已全部载入本贷款协定，具有同等效力，但受下述修正条款的制约（以下把修正过的《普通业务贷款条例》简称为“贷款条例”）。
　　（ａ）取消第２．０１款（１７），并代之如下：“‘ｄｏｌｌａｒ’或‘ｄｏｌｌａｒｓ’或符号‘＄’均指美元。”
　　（ｂ）取消第２．０１款（２６）和（２７），加入新的第２．０１款（２６）如下：“‘美元库’指亚行承诺的未支付的美元借款，其目的是为亚行从普通资金中支付美元贷款进行融资。”
　　（ｃ）取消第３．０２款第一段的最后一句。
　　（ｄ）取消第３．０２款（ｂ）（ｉｉ），并代之如下：“与贷款有关的‘合格借款’指一九九二年六月三十日以后从美元库中提取的亚行未支付借款。”
　　（ｅ）取消第３．０６款（ａ）的最后一句，取消第３．０６款（ｂ）中的“亚行可接受的日期”。
　　（ｆ）取消第４．０２款，并代之如下：“从贷款账户中提取美元。”
　　（ｇ）取消第４．０３款（ａ），并代之如下：“应用美元支付贷款本金。”
　　（ｈ）取消第４．０４款，并代之如下：“应用美元支付贷款任何部分的利息。”
　　（ｉ）取消第４．０５款中的“根据第５．０２款的用于任何特别承诺的费用。”
　　（ｊ）取消第４．０９款，加入如下新的第４．０９款：
　　“即便与本条例的任何规定相矛盾，在例外情况下，若亚行断定它无法用美元支付提款，它可以用自己认为适当的某一种或某几种货币支付。相应的贷款本金和利息应用该种或该几种货币支付。用该种或该几种货币支付的贷款本金的利率将依据亚行随时合理确定的该种或该几种货币的成本加利差确定。
　　第１．０２款　贷款条例中已明确定义的一些术语，在本贷款协定中无论何处使用时，除上下文另有要求外，其词义均按贷款条例的定义解释。下列新增术语具有以下词义：
　　（ａ）“ＨＰＥＣ”指湖南省高速公路建设开发总公司，一九九三年八月三日经湖南省人民政府批准，于一九九三年八月五日在湖南省工商管理局注册的全民所有制企业；
　　（ｂ）“ＪＰＥＣ”指吉林省高速公路公司，一九九三年七月二十日经吉林省人民政府批准，于一九九三年八月六日在吉林省工商管理局注册的全民所有制企业；
　　（ｃ）“ＪＰＥＣ章程”指吉林省人民政府一九九三年七月二十日颁布的《吉林省高速公路公司章程》；
　　（ｄ）“ＮＴＨＳ”指国道主干线，由借款人计划在今后三十年修建总长三万公里、连接所有省会和借款人人口在五十万或以上城市的高等级公路网；
　　（ｅ）“项目执行机构”指在贷款条例所规定的目的与含义范围内，负责执行本项目的吉林省高速公路公司；
　　（ｆ）“项目设施”指在本贷款下提供的设施；
　　（ｇ）“转贷协议”指根据本贷款协定第３．０１款，借款人与吉林省高速公路公司签定的协议；
　　（ｈ）“技术援助”指根据借款人与亚行同日签订的技术援助协议提供的技术援助。

　　第二条　贷款
　　第２．０１款　亚行同意从其普通资金来源中向借款人提供总额为一亿二千六百万美元（＄１２６，０００，０００）的贷款资金。
　　第２．０２款　借款人将根据贷款条例第３．０２款的规定向亚行交付利息。
　　第２．０３款　（ａ）借款人每年应按百分之一的四分之三（０．７５％）的比率缴纳承诺费。自贷款协定签署后六十天开始，按以下规定对贷款金额（随时减去已提金额）计收承诺费：
　　在第一个十二月中按一千八百九十万美元（＄１８，９００，０００）计收；
　　在第二个十二月中按五千六百七十万美元（＄５６，７００，０００）计收；
　　在第三个十二月按一亿零七百一十万美元（＄１０７，１００，０００）计收；
　　之后，则按贷款全额计收。
　　（ｂ）如果取消任何数额的贷款，本条款（ａ）段中所述的每一部分贷款将按取消部分占取消前贷款总额的相同比例减少。
　　第２．０４款　贷款的利息和其他费用应每半年交付一次，即每年六月十五日和十二月十五日交付。
　　第２．０５款　借款人应根据本贷款协定附件二所规定的分期还款表，偿还从本贷款账户中已提取的贷款本金。

　　第三条　贷款资金的使用
　　第３．０１款　（ａ）借款人应根据转贷协议将本贷款转贷给吉林省高速公路公司，转贷条件和条款应使亚行满意。除非借款人和亚行另行同意，转贷条件应包括和本贷款同一水平的转贷利率及包括四年宽限期在内的二十四年的偿还期。外汇风险由吉林省高速公路公司承担。
　　（ｂ）借款人应及时提供，或敦促吉林省人民政府提供给吉林省高速公路公司相当于１２６，０００，０００的美元，用于支付本项目的部分支出。
　　（ｃ）借款人应敦促本项目执行机构按照本贷款协定和项目协议的规定，用本贷款资金支付本项目的支出。
　　第３．０２款　本贷款资金用于货物、服务及其他项目的支出以及按货物、服务及其他项目划分类别所分配的贷款额，应和本贷款协定附件三的规定一致，经借款人和亚行商议后，可随时对此附件修改。
　　第３．０３款　除非借款人和亚行另行同意，所有用本贷款资金支付的货物和服务，必须按照本贷款协定附件四和附件五的规定进行采购，对没按照借款人和亚行一致同意的程序所采购的货物和服务合同，或合同条款不能使亚行满意的合同，亚行可以拒绝提供资金。
　　第３．０４款　除非借款人和亚行另行同意，借款人应敦促由本贷款资金支付的所有货物和服务仅用于本项目。
　　第３．０５款　根据贷款条例第８．０３款的规定，从本贷款账户中提款的终止日是一九九八年十二月三十一日，或经借款人和亚行随时商定的其他日期。

　　第四条　特别契约
　　第４．０１款　（ａ）借款人应敦促项目执行机构按照健全的管理、财务、工程、环境和施工实践勤奋而有效的执行本项目。
　　（ｂ）在本项目执行及项目设施运营过程中，借款人应履行或敦促其履行本贷款协定附件六中规定的全部义务。
　　第４．０２款　借款人应根据需要和亚行可接受的条件和条款，尽快向项目执行机构提供为执行本项目所需的本贷款以外的资金、设施、服务、土地和其他资源。
　　第４．０３款　借款人应按照健全的管理政策和程序，确保指导和协调与本项目执行以及本项目设施运营有关的部门和机构的活动。
　　第４．０４款　借款人应向亚行提供或敦促其提供亚行合理要求的一切报告和资料，包括：（ｉ）本贷款、贷款资金的使用及设施维护；（ｉｉ）用本贷款资金支付的货物、服务及其他项目；（ｉｉｉ）本项目；（ｉｖ）项目执行机构及借款人任何其他与本项目执行和项目设施运营有关单位的管理、运营和财务状况；（ｖ）借款人国内金融和经济情况，以及借款人国际收支状况；（ｖｉ）与本贷款有关的其他事项。
　　第４．０５款　借款人应允许亚行代表检查本项目、用本贷款资金采购的货物及其有关记录和文件。
　　第４．０６款　借款人应从自己一方采取一切必要的行动，使本项目执行机构能够履行其在本项目协议中所承担的义务，包括制定和保持收费，借款人不应采取或允许任何会妨碍履行这些义务的行动。
　　第４．０７款　（ａ）借款人应行使转贷协议中规定的借款人的权力，借以维护借款人和亚行的利益，并实现本贷款的目的。
　　（ｂ）事先未经亚行同意，不得转让、修改、废除或放弃转贷协议中所规定的权力和义务。
　　第４．０８款　（ａ）借款人和亚行双方都认为，在对借款人资产行使留置权方面，亚行之外的外债债权人不应享有超过本贷款的优先权。为此，借款人承诺：（ｉ）除非亚行另行同意，如果以借款人任何资产的留置权作为任何外债的担保，此留置权应根据实际情况，平等地、按比例地保证本贷款本金、利息和其他费用的偿还；（ｉｉ）借款人在建立或允许建立此种留置权时，应对其影响作出明确规定。
　　（ｂ）本款（ａ）段的各项规定不适用于：（ｉ）在采购某项财产时，纯粹为了担保偿付其价款而建立的任何留置权；或，（ｉｉ）在正常银行业务中产生的留置权，以及为期限一年以上的债务作担保而产生的任何留置权。
　　（ｃ）本款（ａ）段中所使用的“借款人资产”一词指借款人的任何行政分支部门或任何机构的资产，以及任何这样的行政分支部门的任何机构的资产，包括中国人民银行的资产和任何其他行使借款人中央银行职能机构的资产。

　　第五条　中止、取消、提前偿还
　　第５．０１款　根据贷款条例第８．０２款（１），现补充规定下列可中止借款人从本贷款账户提款的权利的情况：
　　（ａ）借款人或本项目执行机构不能履行转贷协议中各自应承担的义务；
　　（ｂ）由于吉林省高速公路公司章程或其他任何条款被以任何方式废除、中止或修改，依亚行的看法，将可能对项目的执行或项目设施的运营产生不利影响。
　　第５．０２款　根据贷款条例第８．０７款（ｄ），发生本贷款协定第５．０１款所列的任何一种情况，即构成加速偿还的条件。

　　第六条　生效
　　第６．０１款　根据贷款条例第９．０１款（ｆ），规定下列情况为本贷款协定生效的附加条件：
　　（ａ）本贷款协定须经借款人的国务院核准；
　　（ｂ）转贷协议在形式和内容上要符合亚行要求，并应正式以各方的名义签署和交换，一俟贷款协定生效，即转贷协议生效，其条款对各方即具有约束力。
　　第６．０２款　根据贷款条例第９．０２款（ｄ），向亚行提供的法律意见书应包括以下附加内容：转贷协议经各方批准、认可、签署并交换，其条款对各方具有法律约束力。
　　第６．０３款　根据贷款条例第９．０４款，本贷款协定须在其签字后九十天内生效。

　　第七条　授权
　　第７．０１款　借款人指定吉林省高速公路公司为其代理人，按本贷款协定第３．０２款、第３．０３款和第３．０５款及贷款条例第５．０１款、第５．０２款、第５．０３款、第５．０４款和第５．０５款的规定，采取需要采取或允许采取的任何行动，或签订需要签订或允许签订的任何协议。
　　第７．０２款　吉林省高速公路公司根据本贷款协定第７．０１款的授权而采取的任何行动或签订的任何协议，均对借款人具有同样的约束力，并如同借款人采取的行动或签订的协议具有同样效力。
　　第７．０３款　根据本贷款协定第７．０１款授予本项目执行机构的权力，经借款人与亚行商定后，可予以撤销或修改。

　　第八条　其他规定
　　第８．０１款　根据贷款条例第１１．０２款，中国人民银行行长和常务副行长是借款人的代表。
　　第８．０２款　根据贷款条例第１１．０１款，兹确定以下地址：

　　借款人方面：
　　中华人民共和国　北京西城区成方街３２号
　　中国人民银行　１００８００
　　电报挂号：ＲＥＮＭＩＮＢＡＮＫ　ＢＥＩＪＩＮＧ
　　电传号码：２２６１２　ＰＢＣＨＯ　ＣＮ
　　传真号码：６０１６７２４

　　亚行方面：
　　菲律宾　马尼拉　７８９信箱　亚洲开发银行
　　电报挂号：ＡＳＩＡＮＢＡＮＫ　ＭＡＮＩＬＡ
　　电传号码：２９０６６　ＡＤＢ　ＰＨ　（ＲＣＡ）
　　　　　　　４２２０５　ＡＤＢ　ＰＭ　（ＩＴＴ）
　　　　　　　６３５８７　ＡＤＤＢ　ＰＮ　（ＥＴＰＩ）
　　传真号码：６３２７４１７９６１
　　　　　　　６３２６３２６８１６
　　　　　　　６３２６３１７９６１
　　　　　　　６３２６３１６８１６
　　本协定的缔约双方，通过其各自正式授权代表，于本协定首页所载日期，在亚行总部以各自的名义签署并交换本贷款协定，以昭信守。
　　注：附件一、二、三、四、五、六略。

　　　中华人民共和国　　　　　　　亚洲开发银行
　　　　授权代表
　　　　　黄桂芳　　　　　　　　　　佐藤光夫
　　　　（签字）　　　　　　　　　　（签字）